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12.1 Viner's Analysis of the Price-Specie-Flow Mechanism
Viner's (1924) celebrated study of the Canadian balance ofpayments
before 1914 represents one of the first attempts to verify empirically the
classical adjustment mechanism under the gold standard, as described by ,
the venerable price-specie-flow (PSP) model. In Viner's opinion, the
Canadian experience between 1900 and 1913 provides an almost perfect
opportunity for studying the' operation of the classical adjustment
mechanism. Towards the end ofthe nineteenth century, Ca,nada experi-
enced a remarkable surge in economic growth, triggered by a strong
expansion in exports ofmineral and agricultural products. Around 1903,
the economic boom also led to an enormous acceleration of capital
imports from Great Britain and the United States. Viner felt that the
massive capitalinflow createdconditions highly favorable to an empirical
test of the PSP model. On the basis of Canadian experience, it was
possible to investigate how the capital inflow had been translated into a
real transferofgoods and services andhow efficiently theclassical adjust-
ment mechanism had operated.
After a laborious investigation of the relationship observed between
the Canadian current-account balance, prices, the money stock, and the
capital inflow Viner concluded that
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Canadian borrowings obtained transfer into Canada smoothly and
without noticeable friction in the form ofa net commodity and service
import surplus, as the result of relative price changes (and shifts in
demands) which were of the character indicated as to be expected by
the older writers. (Viner 1937, p. 413)
In order to summarize Viner's account ofthe adjustment mechanism,
suppose that there occurred a once-and-for-all increase in the Canadian
foreign debt. Moreover, assume that the current-account balance was
zeroinitially. AccordingtoViner, thecapitalflow ledto anincreasein the
Canadian money stock as the Canadian borrowers converted their for-
eign-exchange receipts into domestic money and deposited these funds
with thecharteredbanks, thatis, Canada'scommercialbanks. As a result
of the capital inflow, the chartered banks acquired additional reserves.
However, despite the increase in their reserves, the banks did not aug-
ment their lending to Canadian residents; instead, they allowed their
reserves to rise relative to their liabilities. The increase in bank-reserve
ratios implied that the capital inflow was associated only with a primary
round of domestic money creation-a direct result of foreign borrow-
ing-but not with a secondary round, due to an expansion of the banks'
Canadian loans (Viner 1924, chap. 8).1
As the Canadian money stock increased, Canadian demand for goods
and services also rose. Since the prices ofCanadian imports were largely
set abroad, the increase in demand elicited primarily a rise in the relative
prices of nontraded goods. The relative prices of exportable goods also
rose, but less than those oftheir nontraded counterparts. These relative
price changes were responsible for a shift in demand from nontraded to
imported and exportable goods. Thus the current account tended to
deteriorate in response to the capital inflow. Balance-of-payments
equilibrium was restored when the cumulative value of the ensuing
current-account deficits exactly matched the increase in the Canadian
foreign debt. As a result of these deficits, the initial change in the
Canadian moneystock and relative prices was reversed. Since the money
stock and prices only changed temporarily, the current-account balance
in the new equilibrium was once again zero (1924, chaps. 9-11)?
In one respect, Viner found that the Canadian evidence did not con-
form to theclassical PSFanalysis. The studentsofthe pre-1914 Canadian
financial system (Johnson 1910, pp. 49-50; Viner 1924; Beckhart 1929,
pp. 416-17, 430; Shearer 1965, p. 331) generally agree thatthe chartered
banks heldtheirreserves notonlyin theform ofcash, butalso in theform
of foreign short-term assets-in particular, call loans extended in New
York and London, as well as deposits with foreign banks. These foreign
short-term assets, which I shalI'call secondary reserves, could be readily
converted into gold if the chartered banks faced an unexpected drain of
the precious metal. In Viner's opinion, the secondary reserves played an549 Canada without a Central Bank, 1872-1913
important role in the adjustment mec~anism. In the initial phase of the
adjustment process the capital flow was not accompanied by an inflow of
monetary gold, as the proponents of the PSF doctrine would have
argued. Instead, the chartered banks augmented their secondary re-
serves. According to Viner, monetary gold was imported only as a result
of the subsequent increase in the Canadian money stock since the char-
tered banks strove to maintain a stable ratio between their cash reserves
and their liabilities. Thus flows of monetary gold across the Canadian
border were not directly related to the capital inflow, but were a conse-
quence of the change in the Canadian money stock. Viner's conclusions
imply that the pre-1914 Canadian monetary system resembled a gold-
exchange ratherthan a puregold standard. However,-in his view, this did
not render the PSF mechanism inoperative since "fluctuations in the
[secondary] reserves played the same role in the Canadianmechanism as
thatassigned to gold movementsintheclassical doctrine" (1937, p. 414).
Viner's account of the Canadian adjustment mechanism did not go
unchallenged and elicited a large number of critical comments. Two
shortcomings of his analysis are especially noteworthy.
First, his methodofverifyingthePSFmodelis validonlyifcapitalflows
can be regarded as a truly exogenous variable. Viner's verdict as to the
speedandsmoothnessofthe adjustmentmechanismdependscruciallyon
a close positive correlation he uncovered between the current-account
deficit and capital inflows. In the presence ofendogenouscapitalflows, it
is conceivable that the correlation was merely the consequence of com-
mon factors impinging on the two variables. Therefore, the positive
correlation does not necessarily indicate that the current account would
have adjusted quickly if an exogneous capital inflow had occurred. A
numberofauthors treating capitalflows as an endogenousvariable (Carr
1931; Meier 1953; Ingram 1957; Stovel 1959; Borts 1964; Cairncross
1968) have cast doubt on Viner's conclusions and have demonstrated
convincingly that the evidence is consistent with alternative interpreta-
tions of the adjustment mechanism. For example, both the acceleration
ofthe capital inflow and the deterioration ofthe current-account balance
could have been explained by the shift to rapid economic growth
observed around the turn of the century. However, these studies do not
refute the Viner analysis; they merely suggest that Vinerfailed to furnish
sufficient empirical support for the PSF model. Viner himself later on
admitted that the evidence was consistent with alternative interpreta-
tions.
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Second, Viner's analysisofthelink betweentheCanadianmoneystock
and the balance ofpayments leaves much to be desired. A number ofhis
critics have called into question his conclusion as to the unimportance of
secondary money creation in the adjustment mechanism.
4 In reply to his
critics, Viner conceded that "primaryand secondaryexpansion ofmeans550 Georg Rich
of payment both contributed to the creation of a situation in which
necessary import surpluses could develop" (1937, p. 429). However, he
did not completely change his mind in this regard, for he continued to
insist that primary money creation had played the dominant role in the
adjustment mechanism (p. 431).
If we consider the procedure Viner adopted for analyzing money
creation by the chartered banks, his conclusions are hardly surprising.
Interestingly enough, in his 1924 study he did not examine the rela-
tionship between the aggregate liabilities to Canadian nonbanks and the
reserves of the chartered banks, but between a series that he called
foreign-loan deposits and reserves. He defined foreign-loan deposits as
the difference betweenthebanks' aggregate liabilities andloans to Cana-
dian nonbank residents (1924, p. 187).5 As Goodhart (1969, pp. 148-51)
has convincingly demonstrated, the Viner procedure is largely tautologi-
cal since it effectively eliminates from the data on aggregate bank liabili-
ties much of the variation due to secondary money creation.
In his 1937 study Viner evidently sensed the inadequacies ofhis proce-
dure, for he decided to compare bank reserves with aggregate bank
liabilities, as well as with foreign loan deposits. Although even a cursory
glance at the datasuggests thataggregate liabilities and reserves were not
closely correlated, Viner stuck firmly to his conclusions as to the speed
and efficiency of the Canadian PSF mechanism. In his opinion, the
adjustment mechanism had operated efficiently despite the existence in
Canada of a fractional reserve banking system. However, it is doubtful
whether Viner correctly interpreted the available evidence. If he had
carefully scrutinized the data, hewould have noticed that overtheperiod
1900-1913, outofthirteen pairs ofannual changes in aggregate.liabilities
and reserves, five exhibited opposite signs.
6 Thus it does not appear that
the link between the capital inflow, bank reserves, and the money stock
was as close as Viner suggested.
Since Viner's conclusions are not entirely convincing, this paper reex-
amines the Canadian evidence on the operation of the PSF mechanism.
Specifically, the objectives of the paper are twofold.
First, the link between the Canadian balance-of-payments surplus (or
monetary flows in the balance of payments) and the Canadian money
stock is analyzed. A study of this link is hampered by the fact that the
existing data on monetary flows are marred by serious omissions and
inconsistent reporting. In an effort to improve the quality of pre-1914
Canadianbalance-of-paymentsdata, I reestimatedmonetaryflows onthe
basis of unpublished and hitherto unused published evidence available
for the major chartered banks. For a discussion ofthe estimation proce-
dure, the reader is referred to Rich 1983. I show that the evidence
contradicts Viner's account of the way the PSF mechanism operated in
Canada. In the long run, the money stock was determined chiefly by the551 Canada without a Central Bank, 1872-1913
balance ofpayments, as suggested by the classical PSF-doctrine. Howev-
er, in the short run, the two magnitudes were but loosely related. Over
the business cycle, in particular, the money stock was negatively corre-
latedwith the balance-of-paymentssurplus. Themoneystockdisplayed a
distinctive procyclical pattern, while an inverse relationship existed be-
tween the surplus and the business cycle. Thus, contraryto Viner's view,
the PSF mechanism did not work well in the short run.
Second, I attempt to demonstrate that the failure of the PSF mecha-
nism to operate in the short run was an important cause of cyclical
instability in economic activity under the gold standard. The defects in
the PSF mechanism implied that a cyclical change in the demand for
goods and services could be accommodated, at least to some extent, by
procyclical movementsin the moneystock, despite thesevereconstraints
imposed by the gold standard on the ability of central and commercial
banks to create money. The PSF mechanism acted as an effective stabi-
lizer in the longer run, but it did not work quickly enough to prevent
destabilizing movements in the money stock.
The reasons thatvarious defects in the PSFmechanism could generate
procyclical movementsin the moneystock arediscussed in section 12.2of
the paper. In section 12.3 the relationship between the Canadian money
stock and the balance-of-payments is examined. The empirical work is
based on the period 1872-1913 for which adequate data are available,
rather than the much shorter period underlying Viner's study. The prin-
cipal conclusion ofsection 12.3 is that changes in the reserve ratios ofthe
chartered banks were an important source ofthe procyclical movements
in the money stock. Section 12.4 demonstrates how bank-reserve man-
agementwas responsible for thefailure ofthe PSFmechanismtooperate
in the short run and thus contributed to cyclical instability in Canadian
economic activity.
12.2 Procyclical Movements in the Money Stock and
Defects in the Price-Specie-Flow Mechanism
If the PSF mechanism had operated without any flaws, it is likely that
the gold standardwould have acted as an effective automaticstabilizerof
cyclical fluctuations in economic activity. In order to illuminate the
stabilizing role ofthe PSF mechanism, I first assume thatcyclical disturb-
ances were confined to Canada and then move on to the more realistic
case in which business cycles were closely synchronized among the var-
ious gold standard countries.
Suppose that there was a cyclical surge in Canadian economic activity,
while foreign economic activity remainedunchanged. Moreover, assume
that the current-account balance was zero initially. If we abstract from
international capital flows, the cyclical upswing was bound to generate a552 Georg Rich
balance-of-payments deficit. Since, by assumption, the cyclical distur-
bance only affected Canada, foreign demand for Canadian exports was
liable to remain unchanged, while the cyclical increase in Canadian
economic activity induced a rise in imports. Ifthe adjustmentmechanism
had worked along the lines postulated by Viner, the adverse balance of
payments would have caused secondary reserves ofthe chartered banks,
the money stock, andthestockofmonetarygoldto drop. Theadjustment
in the money stock would have acted as an automatic stabilizer designed
to dampen the cyclical surge in economic activity.
The PSF mechanism would not have played a stabilizing role if the
cyclical upswing in Canada had triggered an increase in domestic interest
rates and capital imports. In that case the balance of payments would
have shown a surplus despite the deterioration of the current account.
Thus, the cyclical increase in economic activity could have been
accommodated by a rise in the money stock and an outflow ofmonetary
gold. The possibility ofcapital flows playing a destabilizing role was first
recognized by Taussig (1927, pp. 207-9). In what follows, I attribute
procyclical movements in the moneystockto aTaussig effect iftheywere
caused by destabilizing capital flows?
In practice, cyclical disturbances were not confined to Canada, but
affected several or all the gold standard countries. In a study ofpre-1914
business cycles, Morgenstern (1959, chap. 2) uncovered a high degree of
correlation between cyclical activity in Britain, France, Germany, and
the United States. Moreover, a number of authors have shown that the
Canadian economy was highly sensitive to cyclical fluctuations in U.S.
economic activity. Prior to 1914, there was also a good correspondence
between Canadian and British cycles, but the relationship was less close
than with fluctuations in the United States (Chambers 1964; Hay 1966;
Bonomo and Tanner 1972). In general the parallelism ofcyclical move-
ments was very close within North America and Europe, but less so
between the two continents. However, North American and European
cycles were notoutofphasein any fundamental sense. Theturningpoints
ofmajorcycles coincidedclosely, butNorthAmericawitnessed a number
of minor cycles that were not transmitted to Europe.
The high degree of synchronization among national busines cycles
implies that the gold standard would have acted as an automatic stabi-
lizer, as long as each country was prepared to maintain a rigid link
between its money stock and reserve of monetary gold. Since the world
stock ofmonetary gold was unlikely to vary procyclically ,8 it would have
been impossible for all countries to import simultaneously additional
monetary gold in order to accommodate a cyclical surge in economic
activity through an expansion in their money stocks. Balance-of-
payments surpluses or deficits would not have altered the world stock of
monetary gold; they would merely have redistributed that stock among553 Canada without a Central Bank, 1872-1913
the various countries. The money stocks could have moved procyclically
in some countries, but only at the expense of countercylical fluctuations
in the rest of the world. Thus the gold standard would have played a
stabilizing role in the sense that it would have served as a prophylactic
against procyclical movements in the money stock.
The available evidence for the pre-1914 period suggests that the
prophylactic function of the gold standard left much to be desired.
.Although the cyclical pattern ofthe money stock has not been examined
for all gold-standard countries, it is safe to argue that procyclical move-
ments tended to dominate the scene. Existing research indicates that a
variantoftheTaussig effectwas responsiblefor procyclical movementsin
theBritishmoneystock (Beach1935; Ford1962, chap. 3; Goodhart1972,
pp. 205-7; McCloskeyandZecher1976). A persistentprocyclicalpattern
has also been shown to exist for the U.S. and Canadian money stocks
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Hay 1967). Similarly, it appears that the
German and French money stocks were positively correlated with their
respective business cycles (Rich 1983, chap. 8).
Thepervasive procyclicalpatternofthemoneystockdocumentedfor a
variety ofgold standard countries lends support to the view that the PSF
mechanism suffered from serious defects which loosened the links be-
tween the various national money stocks and the respective reserves of
monetary gold. At least three factors explain why the gold standard did
not forestall procyclical movements in the money stock.
First, monetary authorities frequently did not observe the gold stan-
dard rules ofthe game (see Bloomfield 1959). Even before 1914, govern-
ments or central banks were empowered to issue notes under carefully
specified conditions. Compliance with the rules ofthe game implied that
the monetary authorities did not attempt to offset the impact ofinterna-
tional gold flows on the supply of their notes. If they failed to adhere to
the rules of the game, they effectively detached the money stock from
international gold flows.
Two other sources of destabilizing movements in the money stock
were, respectively, countercyclical changes in the reserve ratios of the
commercial banks and cyclical shifts in the composition ofthat stock as
between notes issued by the monetary authorities and liabilities of the
commercial banks. The problem arising from cyclical movements in
commercial-bank reserve ratios, in particular, was extensively discussed
in the olderliterature on the gold standard (Hawtrey 1928, 1947; Taussig
1927, pp. 200-203; Beach 1935, chap. 2).
Asfar as Canadais concerned, the existing literaturedoes notshedany
light on the reasons for the procyclical pattern of the pre-1914 money
stock. However, the above analysis points to two possible explanations.
The first one is that the Canadian PSF mechanism worked without any
flaws, but defects afflicted the mechanisms of other countries. In this554 Georg Rich
event, procyclical movements in the balance-of-payments surplus would
have been responsible for the observed cyclical pattern of the money
stock. Alternatively, defects in the Canadian mechanism itself might
have been at the root of the problem.
In the following section, the sources of the procyclical movements in
the Canadian money stock are traced, but before proceeding with this
analysis we can dispense with one possible source. In pre-1914 Canada,
destabilizing behavior on the part ofthe monetary authorities was not a
significant cause of cyclical changes in the money stock. Although a
central bankwas not established until 1935, the government was entitled
to issue notes, circulating under the name of Dominion notes. These
notes served both as media of exchange for the nonbank public and as
cash reserves for the chartered banks. Theywere convertible into gold at
a fixed exchange rate and subject to a minimum gold-reserve require-
ment. However, while the government was obliged to maintain a mini-
mum gold reserve, Canadianlegislation did notimpose minimum reserve
requirementsonthe charteredbanks. Nonetheless, the banksheld ample
cash reserves in the form ofgold, subsidiary coin, and Dominion notes in
order to safeguard the convertibility of their liabilities.
A large fraction ofthe Dominion notes was backed by gold in govern-
ment vaults, but occasionally notes were issued on an uncovered basis.
During the pre-1914 period, changes in uncovered Dominion notes,
though quite important prior to 1886, were not a significant source of
cyclical variation in the Canadian money stock. Aside from a temporary
issue of uncovered Dominion notes at the end of 1907, the Canadian
government from 1886 onwards was exemplary in its adherence to the
rules of the game.
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12.3 Cyclical Movements in the Canadian Balance of Payments,
the Monetary Base, and the Money Stock
12.3.1 Balance of Payments and Monetary Base
Table 12.1 presents data on the three major components of the Cana-
dian balance ofpayments.. The current account covers merchandise- and
non-merchandise-trade flows, excluding net interest and dividend re-
ceipts for which the available data are extremely unreliable. The overall
surplus or net monetary inflows equal the first differences in Canada's
stock of international monetary assets, embracing monetary gold in the
hands of the government, as well as monetary gold and secondary re-
serves held by the chartered banks. Data on monetary gold in the hands
ofprivate nonbank residents are not available, but it is generally agreed
that in Canada holdings of gold coin outside the government and the
chartered banks were negligible, at least prior to 1914. The difference555 Canada without a Central Bank, 1872-1913
between the overall and current-account surplus is defined as residual
inflows. In the absence of any errors and omissions, the latter would
cover net interest and dividend receipts, as well as net inflows offoreign
capital, excluding changes in secondary reserves ofthe chartered banks.
Residual inflows are here employed as a proxy for nonmonetary capital
flows. It is safe to assume that over the business cycle, the residual was
closely correlated with nonmonetary capital flows since net interest and
dividend receipts, in all probability, did not display much cyclical
variability.1O
The data on the current account are drawn from the standard sources
(Viner 1924; Hartland 1955, 1960), save for the inclusion of new esti-
mates of nonmonetary gold flows. The series on international monetary
assets is compiled from the official banking statistics (Curtis 1931), but
incorporates new data on monetarygold held by the charteredbanks and
the government, as well as revised estimates ofsecondary reserves. The
available data on international monetary assets appear to be reasonably
accurate for the post-1900 period, but notfor the earlieryears. However,
the quality of the pre-1900 data is adequate for analyz~ng the cyclical
attributes of the overall surplus.
In orderto identify the cyclical characteristics ofthe Canadian balance
of payments, the three components are related to the Canadian refer-
ence-cycle turning points (table 12.1). As indicated by that table, the
overall surplus exhibits a cyclical pattern that is remarkably regular. The
largest (smallest) surpluses tended to coincide with reference-cycle
troughs (peaks), thatis, theoverallsurpluswas negativelycorrelatedwith
the reference cycle throughout the period under study. The only excep-
tion to this finding was the cyclical upswing from 1896 to 1900, during
which exportsofgold (Yukongold rush) andothermineralproductsgrew
very rapidly. The current-account surplus also moved countercyclically,
buttable 12.1 suggests thatits cyclical patternwas not as regular as thatof
the overall surplus.
ll For the subperiod from 1894 to 1904, in particular,
no distinctive pattern can be observed. Residual inflows, by contrast,
displayed a complex pattern. From about 1885 to 1895 and 1900 to 1913,
they also seemto have varied countercyclically, but during the remainder
of the period the fluctuations were irregular.
The conclusions drawn from a cursory examination of table 12.1 are
confirmed by a comparison of the average overall and current-account
surplus, as well as average residual inflows, observed during the boom
and depression phases of the reference cycle. The boom (depression)
phase is defined as the period between the midpoint of a cyclical expan-
sion (contraction) and the midpoint ofthe subsequent contraction (ex-
pansion). For each of the three series shown in table 12.1, the yearly
observations are assigned to either the boom or depression phase, and


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12.2 Cyclical Characteristics of the Balance of Payments and the
Monetary Base (millions of dollars)
Averages of Annual Data Boom Phase Depression Phase
1872-87
Current-account surplus -18.8 -5.6
Residual inflows 16.0 9.9
Overall surplus -2.8 4.3
d monetary base -2.6 4.8
1888-96
Current-account surplus -9.5 -3.3
Residual inflows 4.0 13.8
Overall surplus -5.5 10.5
d monetary base -5.6 10.4
1901-13
Current-account surplus -117.9 -58.8
Residual inflows 119.6 100.5
Overall surplus 1.7 41.7
d monetary base 2.4 41.0
Sources: Table 12.1 and Rich 1983, tables 2-1 and 2-2.
Notes: The following years are assigned to the boom phase: 1872-76, 1881-83, 1886-87,
1889-90, 1892-93, 1895, 1898-1900, 1902-3, 1906-7, 1909-10, 1912-13. The remaining
years are assumed to belong to the depression phase.
datain table 12.1 sufferfrom a numberofmajorbreaks, theperiodunder
study is divided up into subperiods delineated by these breaks. The
subperiod extending from 1897 to 1900, for which the normal cyclical
pattern of the overall surplus does not obtain, is ignored altogether.
Ifthe current account and overall surplus had reached a peak (trough)
neara reference-cycle trough (peak), we shouldfind thatthe correspond-
ing averages were consistently higher during depressions than during
booms. Table 12.2 brings out clearly the expected pattern. Not surpris-
ingly, for residual inflows the datado not reveal a clear-cut pattern. From
1872 to 1887 residualinflows moved procyclically, if at all, while in the
second subperiod the observed pattern was countercyclical. In the third
subperiod no marked cyclical patternseems to have prevailed. However,
the average for booms is strongly influenced by the exceedingly high
figure for 1912. Ifthe averages are recalculated for the shorter subperiod
from 1901 to 1911, they take on values of $60.8 and $100.5 million for
booms and depressions, respectively. Thus, the evidence confirms our
earlier observation that during much of the post-1900 period, residual
inflows varied countercyclically.
On the basis of quarterly data available for the post-1900 period, it is
possible to test the null hypothesis that on average, the overall surplus or
the growth in international monetary assets was the same during booms
and during depressions. The test of the null hypothesis involves rates of559 Canada without a Central Bank, 1872-1913
change, rather than first differences in international monetary assets, in
order to eliminate the scale effect arising from the rapid growth in that
variable after 1900. Ifthe scale effect were not eliminated, the test would
be biased against the cyclical fluctuations in the overall surplus observed
in the early part of the 1900s. As indicated by table 12.3, the null
hypothesis is clearly rejected at the 99 percent level ofsignificance, that
is, the rate ofgrowth in internationalmonetary assets displayed a statisti-
cally significant countercyclical pattern.
The countercyclical movements in the overall surplus also produced
countercyclical movements in the growth ofthe monetary base, assumed
to embrace the bank's cash (in the form ofmonetary gold and Dominion
notes) and secondary reserves, as well as Dominion notes in the hands of
the nonbank public. Alternatively, the monetary base may be defined as
thesumofinternationalmonetaryassets anduncoveredDominionnotes.
Since I pointed out earlier that uncovered Dominion notes did not vary
much over the business cycle, the cyclical pattern of the monetary base
was almost identical to that ofinternational monetary assets (tables 12.2
and 12.3). As indicated by figure 12.2, the growth in the monetary base
invariably reached a peak (trough) near reference-cycle troughs (peaks).
In the subsequent analysis, I assume that the monetary base consisted
entirely of international monetary assets.
12.3.2 Money Stock
The cyclical pattern ofthe balance ofpayments can be contrasted with
that ofthe money stock. In this study I employ a broadlydefined concept
of the money stock, embracing Dominion notes outside the banking
system, demand and notice deposits in the hands ofthe private nonbank
public and the provinces, as well as notes issued by the chartered banks.
Notice (or time) deposits are included in the money stock since they
differed from demand deposits by degree rather than substance. A large
fraction of notice deposits consisted of funds in savings accounts that
were endowed with limited checking privileges.
In table 12.3 various significance tests are performed in order to
ascertainthecyclical attributesofthe moneystock. Thetests arebasedon
quarterly rates ofgrowth in the money stock for the periodfrom 1874 III
to 1913 IV. The evidence suggests that the difference in the average
growth between booms and depressions was not statistically significant.
However, a distinctive cyclical pattern can be discerned from the data if
the reference cycle is split up into an expansion and a contraction phase
(extending from trough to peak and peak to trough respectively).
Throughout the period under study, the average growth in the money
stock was significantly higher during expansions than during contrac-
tions, with the exception ofthe subperiod from 1887 to 1895 for which no

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.561 Canada without a Central Bank, 1872-1913
The evidence suggests that in general, the growth in the money stock
reached a cyclical peak (trough) near the midpoint of an expansion
(contraction). From the cyclical pattern displayed by the growth rate of
the money stock, it is possible to make inferences about the cyclical
pattern ofits level. Ifthe money stock had been characterized by regular
oscillations, the turning points in its level would have followed the
corresponding turning points in its rate ofgrowth (or, more precisely, in
its first differences) by a lag amounting to one quarter ofthe length of a
full reference cycle. Since the growth rates typically peaked at the mid-
point of expansions, it is likely that the peaks in the level coincided with
reference-cycle peaks. Ananalogouspatternwouldhaveobtainedfor the
contraction phase. Consequently, the results of table 12.3 can also be
interpreted to imply that the level of the money stock was positively
correlated with the level of economic activity.
It would be useful to test directly the proposition that the cyclical
turning points in the levels of the money stock and the reference cycle
tended to coincide. As it is well known, however, all the available
techniques for identifying the cyclical turning points in a series subject to
a strong trend are somewhat arbitrary (see Mintz 1969; Beveridge and
Nelson 1981). Besides drawing inferencesfrom the observedvariation in
growth rates, we may analyze the cyclical attributes of the money stock
on the basis of a detrended series. Figures 12.1 and 12.2 show how the
deviations in the money stock from its trend are related to the reference
cycle. The message conveyed by the two charts tends to confirm the
conclusions drawn from the analysis of growth rates. Save for the sub-
period from 1887 to 1895, the detrended money stock as a rule, reached
peaks (troughs) near reference-cycle peaks (troughs) with little evidence
ofsystematic leads or lags between the turning points in the two series.
12
The only exceptions to this rule were the expansion of 1885-87 and the
contraction of 1910-11. During the expansion of1885-87, the detrended
moneystock decreased, but at a much lower rate than during the preced-
ing contraction. Similarly, the contractionof1910-11 witnessed a decline
in the growth of, but not an absolute decrease in, the detrended money
stock. During the subperiod from 1887 to 1895, by contrast, the de-
trended money stock did not always move procyclically (1894-95) or the
cyclical turning points in that stock led cyclical turning points in the
reference cycle by several quarters (1887, 1889, and 1890).
12.3.3 Relationships between the Money Stock
and the Balance of Payments
Since the balance ofpayments was virtually the only source ofchange
in the monetary base, the relationship between the money stock and the
balance ofpayments can be analyzed by examining the link between that


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































two monetary aggregates, it is evident that the cyclical turning points in
the money stock tended to lag the corresponding turning points in the
monetary base. The growth in the base typically peaked near reference-
cycle troughs, while the growth in the money stock attained its highest
value near the midpoint of the subsequent expansion (tables 12.2 and
12.3). Theobservedgrowth patternsimply thatthe level ofthe monetary
base and the money stock, respectively, peaked near the midpoint and
the end of reference-cycle expansions (figure 12.2). Thus, under the
pre-1914 Canadian gold standard, the money stock and the monetary
base, at least in the short run, were not closely correlated.
The reason that therewas only a very loose short-run link between the
two variables must be sought in bank-reserve management. In order to
analyze this link, the money stock is related to the monetary base by the
well-known identity:
(1) M =H(l + e)/(c + e),
where M, H, c, and e denote, respectively, the money stock, the mone-
tary base, the aggregate reserve ratio (cash and secondary reserves -;-
liabilities, i.e., deposits and notes) of the chartered banks, and the
currency-liability ratio (Dominion notes in the hands of the nonbank
public -;- liabilities ofthe banks). Identity (1) captures the various possi-
ble sources of change in the money stock.
Since H varied countercyclically, the procyclical pattern in the money
stockwas not attributable to changes in H, butto marked countercyclical
movementsin the aggregate reserveratio. Thatratio typically rose during
the depression phase of the reference cycle, reaching a peak as it
approached the midpoint of an expansion. The opposite pattern can be
observed for the boom phase (table 12.4.). During the first half of an
expansion, a cyclical increase in the money stock was accompanied by a
cyclical increasein the monetary base, butpartofthe latterwas absorbed
by a drop in the aggregate reserve ratio. During the second half, how-
ever, thecyclical increase in the moneystockwas dueentirelyto acyclical
rise in the aggregate reserve ratio. The currency-liability ratio, by con-
trast, did notmake anycontributiontothecyclical variationin themoney
stock. Holdings of Dominion notes outside the banking system were
neither a large component of the money stock,13 nor did e fluctuate
cyclically (table 12.4).14 Prior to 1914, the Canadian money stock con-
sisted almost exclusively of assets supplied by the chartered banks.
An analysis of the link between the Canadian money stock and the
balance of payments also yields intriguing results concerning the role of
gold flows in the adjustment mechanism. During the periodunderstudy,
the monetarygold stocktypicallyvariedin acountercyclicalfashion, very
much like total international monetary assets. The only exception to this
pattern was once again the subperiod from 1897 to 1900. Prior to 1897,565 Canada without a Central Bank, 1872-1913
Table 12.4 Cyclical Characteristics of the Aggregate Reserve Ratio and the
Currency-Liability Ratio (percent)
Boom Depression Expansion Contraction
Phase Phase Phase Phase Total
Aggregate Reserve Ratio
1873-1887 30.2 29.1 37.5 26.0 29.6
1887-1900 22.9 24.3 24.3 22.5 23.7
190G-1913 25.8 25.9 28.7 23.8 25.9
Currency-Liability Ratio
1873-1913 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Source: Calculated from Rich 1983, table 3-3.
Notes: The data in the table represent arithmetic means ofend-of-year ratios. The annual
observations were allocated to the various reference-cycle phases in the following way.
Boom phase: 1873-75, 188G-82, 1886, 1889,1892,1894-95,1898-99,1902,1905-6,1909,
1912-13. Expansion phase: 1879-81, 1885-86, 1888-89, 1891-92, 1894, 1896--99, 1901,
1904-5,1908-9,1911. The depression and contraction phases cover the respective remain-
ing years.
however, thecountercyclicalmovementsin themonetarygold stockwere
completely dwarfed by secondary-reserve flows. After 1900 the ampli-
tude of these movements increased considerably relative to that of sec-
ondary reserve flows, but the latter continued to fluctuate more strongly
than the former. Table 12.3 sheds light on the cyclical attributes of the
monetary gold stock. Over the subperiod from 1888 III to 1894 IV, for
which reasonably reliable semi-annual data are available, the monetary
gold stock tended to grow most rapidly (slowly) during the contraction/
expansion phase of the reference cycle. The observed cyclical pattern,
however, was not statistically significant. In the post-1900 period, by
contrast, the growth in the monetary gold stock displayed a statistically
significant countercyclical pattern.
IS
In summary, the Canadian evidence on the link between the money
stock and the balance ofpayments does not accord well with the classical
PSF-analysis. Overthe business cycle, the growth in the moneystockwas
notcloselycorrelatedwith the overall balance-of-paymentssurplus. Dur-
ing the latter stages of a reference-cycle expansion and contraction, in
particular, the balanceofpaymentsfailed to act as aneffectiveprophylac-
tic against procyclical movements in th~ moneystock. These movements
were not due to a procyclical pattern ofthe current-account surplus orto
the influence of a Taussig effect, but were explained by a defect in the
Canadian PSF mechanism. Consequently, the evidence clearly contra-
dicts Viner's assertion that the Canadian mechanism operatedefficiently
both in the short and long run.
Atleast for the post-1900 period, the evidence is also inconsistentwith
Viner's contention that payments imbalances were settled by flows of566 Georg Rich
secondary reserves, rather than monetary gold. Admittedly, over the
business cycle, secondary reserves fluctuated more strongly than mone-
tarygold, butafter 1900 theroles playedin the adjustment mechanism by
the two categories of monetary flows were no longer fundamentally
different. Interestingly enough, during cyclical upswings, the deteriora-
tion in the overall balance ofpayments implied that Canadacurtailed the
growth in imports ofmonetary gold. In this manner, precious metal was
made available to the rest ofthe world and helped to accommodate to a
modest extent cyclical upswings through increases in the money stock
abroad.
12.4 The Role of Bank-Reserve Management
in the Canadian Business Cycle
Considering the importance of bank-reserve management as a source
of procyclical movements in the Canadian money stock, the question
arises how profit-maximizing banks, operating within the constraints of
the gold standard, could contribute to cyclical instability in economic
activity. In this section ofthe paper, I sketch in a nontechnical manner a
model designed to elucidate the significance of bank-reserve manage-
ment as a destabilizing force.
16 The theoretical analysis rests upon two
building blocks. First, following the majority of other investigators, I
assume that cyclical movements in Canadian economic activity were
induced by disturbances from abroad. For the sake of simplicity, the
foreign cyclical disturbance is depicted by an exogenous change in Cana-
dian exports. Furthermore, drawing onthe research by Bryce (1939) and
Rosenbluth (1958), I assume thatacyclical changein exportsresultedin a
deterioration rather than an improvement in the Canadian current-
account balance, owing to an accelerator effect on imports of capital
goods. Second, the model incorporates the observation that the char-
tered banks accommodated cyclical movements in economic activity by
varying the aggregate reserve ratio. Countercyclicalchangesin the aggre-
gate reserve ratio couldhave beencausedby a numberoffactors, butas a
first step I assume that they were the result ofprocyclical movements in
domestic interest rates or in the opportunity cost of holding reserves.
Now suppose that a cyclical expansion in foreign economic activity
elicited a rise in Canadian exports. Provided the Canadian current and
capital-account balance was zero initially, the impact effect ofthe exoge-
nous disturbance was to augment economic activity, the demand for
money, andinterest ratesin Canada. Asinterestratesrose, thechartered
banks were prompted to expand the money supply by lowering the
aggregate reserve ratio. But the impact effect of the exogenous distur-
bance was not the end of the story. The cyclical surge in Canadian
economic activity was associated with a deterioration in the current-567 Canada without a Central Bank, 1872-1913
account balance. Abstracting for the moment from capital flows, the
current-account deficit should have led to a reduction in the monetary
base, pushing up domestic interest rates still further.
The surge in economic activity tapered off when exports 'reached a
cyclical peak. The theoretical analysis suggests that a subsequent down-
turn in economic activity, induced by a cyclical drop in exports, did not
cause domestic interest rates to decline instantaneously. At this stage of
the cycle, domesticinterestrateswere influencedby two opposingforces.
On the one hand, the cyclical contraction in economic activity and the
attendant decrease in the demand for money tended to lower domestic
interest rates. On the other hand, the overall balance-of-payments defi-
cit, inherited.from the previous expansion, induced a decrease in the
monetarybase, puttingupward pressureondomesticinterestrates. Since
the monetary base ceased to fall at the end of a boom, domestic rates
shouldhave reached a cyclical peakatsomepointduring thefirst halfofa
reference-cycle contraction. In otherwords, the cyclical turningpointsin
domestic interest rates should have followed the corresponding refer-
ence-cycle turning points with a time lag amounting to less than half the
length ofthe respective reference-cycle expansion or contraction. Thus,
the model yields a testable proposition about the cyclical pattern of
Canadian interest rates.
Since there is a dearth ofstatistics onpre-1914 Canadianinterest rates,
I limit myself to an examination of the cyclical movements in the Mon-
treal call-loan rate, for which data are available for the period 1900-
1913.
17 Figure 12.3 suggests that the Montreal call-loan rate tended to
peakduring the first half(1903) ornearthe midpoint (1911) ofreference-
cycle contractions. Duringthe contractionof1907-8,it attainedapeakof
6percentin the first quarterof1907 andstayed at thatleveJ for halfa year
(on a seasonally adjusted basis). Therefore, the timing of that peak is
somewhat uncertain. The evidence is consistent with the view that the
Montreal call-loan rate peaked either during the first half or near the
midpoint of the contraction of 1907-8. Similarly, the cyclical troughs in
that rate tended to occur during the first half (1901, 1905) or near the
midpoint (1909, 1912) of reference-cycle expansions. On the whole the
cyclical peaks (troughs) in the Montreal call-loan rate were closer to the
midpoints ofreference-cycle contractions (expansions) than to the refer-
ence-cycle peaks (troughs). For the period extending from the trough of
1901 to the peakof1912, the turningpointsin the Montreal call-loan rate
lagged the corresponding turning points in the reference cycle by an
average of 2.5 quarters and led the corresponding midpoints by an
average of 0.7 quarters.
I8 Thus, the theoretical analysis is at least partly
supported by the empirical evidence. The Montreal call-loan rate clearly
lagged the reference cycle, but for roughly halfofall the expansions and













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.569 Canada without a Central Bank, 1872-1913
Interestinglyenough, thecyclical patternofthe Montrealcall-loan rate
mirrored closely the cyclical pattern of the monetary base (figure 12.4).
Thestrong negative correlation observed between cyclical movements in
the two variables suggests that over the business cycle the balance of
payments was the chief determinant of the Montreal call-loan rate.
During the depression phase ofthe reference-cycle, for example, the size
ofthe overall surplus was above average. International monetary assets,
as well as the monetary base, tended to grow rapidly and caused the
Montreal call-loan rate to decline.
The model is capable of explaining the cyclical patterns revealed by
figure 12.4 if we assume that the aggregate reserve ratio was negatively
related to both domestic interest rates and cyclical movements in eco-
nomic activity. It is plausible to argue that a cyclical expansion (contrac-
tion) in economic activity resultedin adrop (rise) in theaggregate reserve
ratio even if interest rates remained constant. A cyclical slump in eco-
nomic activity, for example, opened up the prospect of major bank
failures. Ifthe reserve holdings ofthe chartered banks were inadequate,
the prospect of bank failures could result in a run on the banks and an
attendant liquidity crisis. In order to be able to weather a potential
liquidity crisis, the banks were likely to build up precautionary reserves
when theeconomypilll1ged into a recession.
19 Itwould have beensensible
for the chartered banks to vary their reserve ratios in a countercyclical
manner despite the fact that during the period under study, Canada-
unlike the United States-did not experience runs on banks and major
liquidity crises. The public confidence instilled by strong countercyclical
movements in the aggregate reserve ratio could have been a reason for
the absence of financial panics in Canada.
Provided the aggregate reserve ratio responded to cyclical movements
in economic activity, a cyclical increase in exports andthe ensuing expan-
sion in economic activity, in the short run, caused both the supply ofand
demandfor moneyto rise. Thesupplywas boostedas thecharteredbanks
curtailedtheirprecautionaryreservesin relation totheirliabilities. Given
the simultaneous increase in money demand and supply, the Montreal
call-loan rate need not have changed in the short run. However, this did
not imply that it was completely invariant to the'cyclical disturbance. In
the longer run, the cyclical deterioration in the overall balance of pay-
ments, as well as the attendant drop in the monetary base, led to an
increase in the Montreal call-loan rate. Thus, it is possible to explain why
a cyclical increase in that ratewas due chiefly to a cyclical reduction in the
monetary base, despite the fact that the ultimate source of the distur-
bance was a cyclical expansion in exports.
Needless to say, the explanation advanced in this paperfor the cyclical
pattern ofthe Montreal call-loan rate would not be valid if the Canadian



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.571 Canada without a Central Bank, 1872-1913
Canadian money-market rates would have moved in unison with their
U.S. equivalents and would not have been systematically related to the
Canadian monetary base. Prior to 1914, however, cyclical movements in
Canadian and U.S. call-loan rates were anything but perfectly synchro-
nized. In figure 12.3 the Montreal call-loan rate is compared with the
corresponding rates in New York and Boston, the two closest major
American financial centers. The evidence clearly indicates that the Mon-
treal call-loan rate lagged its New York and Boston equivalents. More-
over, the cyclical amplitude of the two U.S. rates was much larger than
that of the Montreal call-loan rate. It is interesting to note that the
average return on Canadian bankloans, as well as Canadian bond yields,
on the whole, also displayed a smaller cyclical variance than their U.S.
equivalents (Rich 1983, chap. 5). Since the cyclical stability of interest
rates was much greater in Canada than in the United States, it is not
surprising that the capital inflow to Canada often varied countercyclical-
ly. The relative stability of Canadian interest rates explains why the
capital account frequently made a significant contribution to the counter-
cyclical movements in the overall balance-of-payments surplus.
Evidently, bank-reserve management was not only responsible for
procyclical movements in the money stock, but also served to keep the
cyclical variance of Canadian interest rates within narrow bounds. Fur-
thermore, the ability of the banks to accommodate a cyclical surge in
economic activity through an expansion in the money stock delayed the
upward adjustmentin interest ratesthatwould normallyhaveoccurredat
this stage ofthe business cycle. Interest rates did eventually rise, but not
quickly enough to restrain effectively a cyclical expansion in economic
activity. Typically, they continuedto rise well aftereconomic activity had
reached a cyclical peak. In this way, the rise in interest rates was liable to
aggravate the subsequent contraction. Consequently, the evidence lends
strong support to the view that bank-reserve management amplified the
cyclical fluctuations in Canadian economic activity by diluting the stabi-
lizing role of interest rates.
12.5 Summary and Conclusions
Inthis paperI attemptedto showthatthePSFmechanismdid notact as
an effective stabilizer of cyclical fluctuations in economic activity.
Althoughthe gold standardconstrainedthe ability ofthe charteredbanks
to create money, the restrictions imposed on the banks were not severe
enough to prevent procyclical movements in the Canadian money stock.
The fetters were sufficiently flexible to allow them to accommodate a
cyclical surge in economic activity through an expansion in the money
stock. Accommodative behavior on the part of the banks did elicit
balance-of-payments deficits (or a reduction in the growth of interna-572 Georg Rich
tional monetary assets), as suggested by the classical PSF doctrine.
However, while the PSFmechanism operatedin the long run, the deficits
did not effectively curb the growth in the money stock in the short run.
Accommodative behavior also delayed the increase in Canadian interest
rates that would normally have followed the cyclical surge in economic
activity. Interest rates were adjusted only when the overall balance of
payments began to deteriorate. Consequently, the PSFmechanism even-
tuallyforced up interestrates. Butthey responded to thecyclical increase
in economicactivitywith such alonglag thattheywereliable to aggravate
the subsequent contraction, instead of restraining the expansion. In
summary, the evidence is inconsistent with Viner's contention that the
Canadian PSF mechanism operated smoothly not only in the long run,
but also in the short run.
Notes
1. Vinerdid notcomparebankreserveswith the moneystock, butwithbankliabilitiesto
Canadian nonbanks, which consisted of notes, demand and notice (or time) deposits. As
will be shown later, bank liabilities accounted for the lion's share of the money stock.
2. Viner also analyzed the more realistic case of a permanent increase in the capital
inflow. He clearly realized that there was a difference between a once-and-for-all change in
Canada's foreign debt and a permanent increase in its growth (1924, pp. 177-80). In his
analysis he ignored the implications of changes in interest payments on the foreign debt.
3. According to Viner(1937, pp. 429-30), itwas "possible to argue thatattimes at least"
the observed increase in the money stock was due to purely internal factors, rather than a
capital inflow. The rise in the money stock caused the current account to deteriorate.
Moreover, "the borrowings were engaged in to obtain the foreign funds necessary to
liquidate trade balances already incurred." However, he felt this interpretation was "quite
consistent with the orthodox explanation." He also admitted that the current-account
balance was likely to respond to an exogenous capital inflow with a lag (1937, p. 423).
4. To be precise, in his 1924 study Viner argued that secondary money creation had
played a role only towards the end of the period under study (1924, pp. 189-90).
5. Viner (1924, pp. 184--85) appears to have argued that loans to Canadian residents
were unrelated to the capital inflow.
6. See Viner'stable VI (1937, p. 428). In 1902-3,1906-7,1910-11,and 1912-13reserves
decreased (column 6), while liabilities increased (column 1). For 1907-8 the opposite
pattern can be observed.
7. TheTaussig effect has been revived and reformulated by Johnson (1972, chap. 9) and
othersunderthe headingofthe monetaryapproachto balance-of-payments analysis. Foran
application of that approach to the gold standard, see McCloskey and Zecher 1976.
8. It is likely that the world stock of monetary gold was negatively correlated, if at all,
with the business cycle. During a cyclical upswing, the demand for nonmonetary gold was
liable to 'rise, drawing the precious metal away from monetary use. Needless to say, this
argument is not applicable to long swings in economic activity which, among otherfactors,
were caused by changes in gold production, resulting from new discoveries.
9. During the entire period under study, the Canadian government and the chartered
bankswere neverforced to suspendtheconvertibilityintogold ofDominionnotesand bank
liabilities respectively. After the United States returned to the gold standard in 1879, the573 Canada without a Central Bank, 1872-1913
mint-par values ofthe U.S. and Canadian currencies were identical, that is, the Canadian
dollarwas worth US $1.00. Foradetaileddiscussion ofpre-1914 Canadian monetarypolicy,
see Rich 1977, 1983, chap. 7.
10. Much of Canada's foreign debt was held in the form of fixed-interest assets. Some
informationis available onnetinterestpaid to foreigners by the Canadiangovernment. This
item did not vary with the reference cycle (Rich 1983, chap. 7).
11. The countercyclical pattern ofthe current-account surplus mirrored strong counter-
cyclical movements in the merchandise-trade surplus. It is well known (see Taylor 1931,
p. 3) that the Canadian merchandise-trade surplus was negatively correlated with the
business cycle.
12. Hay (1967) argues that the turning points in the money stock led the corresponding
turningpointsin economicactivity. However, his conclusionis notinconsistentwith my own
since he compares rates ofchange in the money stock with the level of economic activity.
13. The Canadian government possessed a monopoly ofthe issue ofnotes in denomina-
tions of$4 and less. The nonbank public did not use the Dominion notes to any greatextent
unless it was compelled to do so by the government.
14. This evidence contrasts sharply with that presented by Cagan (1965) for the United
States for the same period. For the United States, it was movements in the currency ratio
that dominated cyclical movements in the money stock, whereas movements in the reserve
ratio played a relatively minor role.
15. A more detailed discussion of these points is provided in Rich 1983, chap. 3.
16. For a full discussion of the model, see Rich 1983, chap. 4.
17. Only rudimentary data are available on other Canadian bank-loan rates. The evi-
dence suggests that the average return on Canadian bank loans exhibited the same cyclical
pattern as the Montreal call-loan rate (Rich 1983, chap. 5).
18. The turning points in the Montreal call-loan rate are determined on the basis of
seasonally adjusted quarterly data (see figure 12.3). The timing ofthe turning points does
notpose any problems, exceptfor the peakof1907 thatI assume to have occurredattheend
ofthesecond quarter. Forthe reference cycle, a turning pointormidpointoccurring in, say,
March-April and February, respectively, is assigned to the end and the middle ofthe first
quarter.
19. Forasimilarexplanationofcyclical movementsin bank-reserveratios, see Friedman
and Schwartz 1963, pp. 449-62 and Morrison 1966, chap. 3.
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Comment Peter Temin
It is both a pleasure and a burden to comment on Dr. Rich's paper-
pleasure because the paper is an interesting one that contains an intri-
guing view of the Canadian economy before the First World War; a
burden because it appears to be a summary of a larger work as yet
unpublished and inaccessible to me in the time allowed for the writing of
comments. I will enjoy the pleasure and try to ignore the burden, recog-
nizing thatDr. Rich maywell have all theanswers in his largerworktothe
questions I pose here.
My comment has three parts. First, I want to place Rich's argument
about Viner into the context of modern theories of the balance of pay-
ments. Second, I will review Rich's argument and thetests he performsto
substantiate it. And third, I will redo a few of his tests from a slightly
different perspective and comment on the results.
There seem to be three theories of the balance ofpayments that have
achievedwide currency today. The price-specie-flow theoryviews capital
flows as exogenous and uses a flow concept of equilibrium: trade flows
mustinteractwith capitalflows to provide a balance-of-paymentsequilib-
rium. Themonetarytheoryofthebalanceofpaymentsviews capitalflows
as endogenous and uses a stock concept ofequilibrium: residents ofeach
country must desire to hold the existing stock of money. These two
theories differ both in how they view capital flows (exogenously or
endogenously) and how theyview equilibrium (flow orstock), suggesting
that theories ofthe balance ofpayments can be arranged in a two-by-two
table.
Table C12.1 is such an arrangement, where the two theories just
discussed form the main diagonal. Only one ofthe off-diagonal alterna-
tives is represented in theliterature. Itis what I will call the "real" theory
ofthe balance ofpayments which uses a Keynesian flow equilibrium and
views capital flows as endogenously determined to maintain this equilib-
rium. The final combination-exogenouscapital flows and stock equilib-
rium-is not yet represented in the literature.
Tests ofthese different theories are hard to design, which may be one
reason why they are still extant. In order to discriminate between them,
investigators generally have looked at the mechanisms underlying these
different theories. The price-specie-flow theory consequently has been
tested by a long line of scholars from Viner to Rich by looking at the
operation of the banking system to see if the money stock responded to
changes in capital flows. McCloskey and Zecher have evaluated the
monetary theory by asking whether markets in different countries were
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integrated. And Ingram (1957) verified that for Canada, capital flows
could be explained by the needs of domestic investment.
It is worth noting that the tests of the price-specie-flow theory have
generally been negative, while the tests of the other two theories have
tended to be positive. Does this tell us something about the world or
about publication bias? Without the ability to test the suggestion, I
suspect that the power ofthe tests used to accept these theories is rather
small.
Rich suppliesin this papernew disconfirmation oftheprice-specie-flow
theory. As with most other tests ofthis theory, he examines its apparent
Achilles heel-the link between the balance ofpayments and the domes-
tic money supply. Rich first criticizes Viner and then constructs a new
data set to perform a better test. He argues that the Canadian money
stockdid notvary countercyclically. Infact itvariedprocyclically, butnot
because of the behavior of the monetary authorities and not because of
what Rich calls the "Taussigeffect"-inducedcapitalflows thatcause the
balance ofpayments to move procyclically. And not, in fact, because the
monetary base failed to move countercyclically. The money stock moved
procyclically because anticyclical movements in the reserve ratio of the
Canadian banking system more than offset the anticyclical pattern ofthe
monetary base.
Before discussing Rich's explanation for this phenomenon, it is worth
pausing for a moment to look at the evidence, which, in keeping with
much of the evidence of the paper, is curiously indirect. Rich first aver-
ages the rates of growth of the money stock in all of the booms and
depressions from 1874 to 1913. This procedure fails to produce any
significant difference between the booms and depressions. So Rich then
averages the rates of growth of the money stock in the expansions and
contractions of the economy. (A boom includes the period of high
economic activity, both before and after a cyclical peak, while an expan-
sion includes the periodwhen the rate ofchange ofeconomic activitywas
positive, from a cyclical trough to a cyclical peak.) Here he finds a
pattern; the money stock grew faster in expansions than contractions.
This pattern suggests, according to Rich, that the rate ofgrowth ofthe578 Georg Rich
money stock peaked near the middle of expansions. If the Canadian
economy resembled a regular oscillator, the patternimplies thatthe level
ofthe moneystock, which should have followed the rate ofgrowth with a
quarter-cycle lag, peaked at the end ofexpansions, that is, at the cyclical
peak. In other words, the level ofthe money stock was positively corre-
lated with the level of economic activity.
This conclusion gains onlyindirectsupportfrom the foregoing chain of
reasoning. I do not know why Rich did not compute the correlation
directly, and there are not .enough data in the paper for me to do so.
Perhaps the book contains the data needed to verify his statement.
Having laid the price-specie-flow theory to rest, Rich sets out to
explain what was going on in,turn-of-the-century Canada. His model is
only sketched out in this paper, but it appears to go like this:
An "expansion offoreign activity," which appears to mean an expan-
sion of Canadian exports, sets off the Canadian expansion. Canadian
production rose" putting lip.ward pressure on the money supply. Interest
rates rose, andbanks reduced theirreserve ratios bothbecause theywere
less afraid offailure during a boom than during a depression and because
they wanted to take advantage ofthe profit opportunities offered by the
higher interest rates.
Thereduction in reserve ratios moderatedthe rise in interestrates, and
Rich suggests that Canadian interest rates varied less over the cycle than
comparable U.S. ones-anotion verified in Rich's book, although not in
his paper. Since the datafor replication ofthis testwere available to me, I
will comment on it shortly.
Butit is worth noting that this test is also indirect. Since the core ofthe
theoryis about Canadianreserve ratios, itwould benice toseedataabout
them or comparisons between them and, say, U.S. ones. After the next
step, a comparison ofcyclical movements in the money stock in the two
countries, the meaning of a smaller variance of the Canadian interest
rates would be clear.
Returning to the theory, Rich argues that the Canadian expansion led
to a deficit in the current account, a patternthat seems odd in light ofthe
role of export expansion in causing the expansion. Rich appears to be
saying that the expansion, once started by an export rise, acquired a life
of its own. He claims both that the relative stability of interest rates
encouraged the expansion and thatit discouraged capital imports, reduc-
ing the monetary base. The relative magnitudes of these effects is not
clear, but the existence ofthe latter suggests caution in accepting Rich's
principai conclusion thatthe Canadian banking system aggravated Cana-
dian business cycles.
Rich places great weight on the link between interest rates and capital
imports in deriving the second test ofhis theory. He argues that peaks in
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reduction in economic activity worked to lower interest rates, but the
decrease in the monetary base resulting from the cyclical capital exports
kept them up. Consequently, interest rates did not decline immediately
after the peak.
There are two problems with this test. First, since Rich argues that the
effect ofthefall in the reserve ratio oninterestrateswas strongerthanthe
effect ofthe fall in the monetarybase during the expansion, it is not clear
why it was not stronger also during the early stages of the contraction.
Second, again the test is curiously indirect. Rich reports thatpeaks in the
first differences in the interest rate coincided with cyclical peaks in
economic activity, so the peak in the interest rate itself must have fol-
lowed it. A more direct test would have beenpreferable, andI will report
the results of one here.
Both of Rich's tests of his positive theory involve interest rates. And
since these rates were available in the sources he cites, I replicated them.
The rates involved are call-money rates in Montreal, New York, and
Boston. I presume this rate was used because it was available, but I
wonder how closely it mirrors overall monetary conditions in Canadian
financial markets. As before, I can only presume that evidence on this
question appears in Rich's longer work.
The first proposition is the the Canadian interest rate varied less than
the U.S. rate. Andit did. Thevariance ofthe Montrealrate was 0.34; the
New York rate, 7.67; and the Boston rate, 2.76. But while the result of
this test is favorable to Rich's theory, examination ofthe raw data raises
some uncomfortable questions. There are five occasions between 1900
and 1913, when the Montreal rate is available, that it was reported as
constant for eight months or more. In four ofthese episodes the interest
rate was an integer; one of the episodes lasted for nineteen months
(October 1906, through April 1908).
This constancy in a call-money rate is puzzling in the extreme. If the
rate was accurately reported, then there is more to the Canadian institu-
tions than Rich has allowedin his tale. Andiftheperiods ofconstancyare
the results of gaps in reporting, then the test is weaker thanit appears.
As an aside, it is worth noting that the New York and the Boston
call-money rates were more highly correlated (p = .72) than either was
with the Montreal rate. But since the Montreal and Boston rates were
more highly correlated (p = .42) than the Montreal and New York rates
(p = .26), it is hardto know ifthis was the effect ofdistance orofnational
boundaries. Given the constancy of the exchange rate between Canada
and the United States, is an argument needed to justify analyzing Cana-
dian monetary conditions separately from those in the United States?
Rich's second proposition is that cyclical peaks in the Montreal call-
money rate lagged behind peaks in Canadian economic activity. Taking
the peaks and troughs ofeconomic activity from Rich's table 12.1 andthe580 Georg Rich
peaks and troughs ofthe interest rate from the rates as reportedin Rich's
sources yields the results shown in table C12.2. Thepeaks and troughs of
reference cycles and of interest-rate cycles are shown using Rich's nota-
tion whereby the number after the slash is the month. Figures in paren-
theses are the duration ofpeaks and troughs when the interest rate was
constant for several months at its extreme value. The lag of the interest
rate behind the reference cycle is shown in months, where a negative
number indicates a lead and a range indicates uncertainty about the
interest-rate peak or trough.
The data offer only limited support to Rich's hypothesis. The interest
rate lagged behind general economic activity at the trough of the refer-
ence cycle, butitled as often as it lagged atthepeak. Onlyin 1910 did the
interest rate clearly peak after the economy. It may have done so as well
in 1906-7, but the constancy of the interest rate for nineteen months
aroundits peakprecludes any firm conclusion. Consideringthe shortlags
at several ofthe peaks, it might be fair to say that the peaks were roughly
contemporaneous at three ofthe four peaks where determination can be
made, while the interest rate clearly lagged at the fourth. In short, the
interest rate lagged behind economic activity at troughs, but not (in
general) at peaks.
Rich's story, therefore, stands as an intriguing hypothesis. It is hard to
do justice to a monograph in a brief summary, and the problems of the
tests used in this papermay well be solved in Rich's forthcoming book. I
hope so for two reasons. First, the storyis an appealing one. Andsecond,
it offers a "nonmonetary"theoryfor thelower-right-handcell in my table
C12.1. Rich clearly views capital movements as endogenous, and he
appears to say that they move to establish a stock equilibrium. But, in
Table C12.2 Timing of Troughs and Peaks in Canadian Interest Rates Compared
with Timing of Business Cycle
Lead(-) or Lead(-)or
Date Lag (+) Date Lag (+)
in Months in Months
Reference- Interest- at Reference- Interest- at
Cycle Rate Reference Cycle Rate Reference
Peak Peak Peak Trough Trough Trough
1900/04 1900/01 -3 1901/02 1901/09 7
1902/12 1902/10- -2-1 1904/06 1905/04-09 (6) 10-15
1903/01 (4)
1906/12 1906/10- -2-16 1908/07 1909/02-09 (8) 7-14
1908/04 (19)
1910/03 1910/12- 9-11 1911/07 1912/06-08 (3) 11-13
1911/02 (3)
1912/11 1912/01 (1) 2581 Canada without a Central Bank, 1872-1913
contrast to the monetary theory, the equilibrium is in the bond market,
not the money market. Thatis, capital moves internationallyin response
to interest-rate differentials in much the same way as capital moves
domestically between any two assets of slightly differing characteristics
earning quite different returns. It moves until the holders of each asset
are happy with the quantities they hold at market prices. Rich's story,
therefore, is important both for Canadian history and for balance-of-
payments theory.
Reference
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General Discussion
PIPPENGER expressed puzzlement regarding Rich's references to the
transfer problem. If a country suddenly finds that four-fifths of its gold
stock has disappeared, Pippenger argued, it can merely run balance-of-
payments surpluses until its gold stock is restored to desired levels. This
action may entail some change in the. combination of traded and non-
traded goods that the country produces, at least during the process of
adjustment, but Pippenger saw no reason why this should create a prob-
lem, and hence no justification for the phrase "transfer problem."
Several participants suggested that the problem potentially lay in the
economy's inability to adjust the combination of traded and nontraded
goods, orimportables andexportables, thatwas required tofacilitate the
adjustment process. In this view, countries can experience a transfer
problem when the excess demand for money entails a shift in demand
away from one type of good and toward another, but markets do not
function so as to smoothly effect the transfer of resources.
MELTZER argued that an excess demand for commodities would be
satisfied both by an excess supply of securities and a money flow. The
excess supply ofsecurities would raise interest rates, which would move
securities and also cause a movement along the demand-for-money
curve, releasing some ofthe excess supply ofmoney to go along with the
excess supply of securities.
CAGAN prefaced his remarks with a caution to those who refer to
"typical" cyclical patterns or "average" cyclical patterns. In fact, Cagan
pointed out, cyclical patterns can vary greatly, and cyclical averages can
be a very misleading indicator of the characteristics of a majority of
cycles. Before generalizing, it is necessary to examine each cycle, or at
least a large number of them, and to analyze the degree to which they582 Georg Rich
conform to a typical pattern. On the other hand, the pattern Rich
documents for Canada is typical also of the United States, and it would
not be surprising if it were typical of many other countries as well.
Caganalso commentedonRich's discovery thatCanada'sreserve ratio
moves countercyclically: the reserve ratio declines during expansions,
which would give rise to an increase in money supply, and rises in
contractions. In his study of the U.S. money supply, Cagan did not find
that changes in the reserve ratio were the main reason why the money
supplyfluctuated cyclically. The UnitedStates'smoneysupplymovedfor
a variety of reasons, the most important of which was the currency-
deposit ratio.
Cagan's study of U.S. interest rates showed that they tend to lag the
business cycle, particularly at the trough. Thus, interest rates in Canada
and the UnitedStates exhibitsimilarcyclical behavior. Theparallel is not
surprising .because U.S. and Canadian interest rates are connected by
interest arbitrage.
KOCHIN asked whether it was realistic to treat Montreal as another
adjunct to the New York money market, much like St. Louis, San
Francisco, or Philadelphia. He wondered whether interest rates in Can-
ada and in the American West exhibited similar relationships to fluctua-
tions in the New York rate.
EICHENGREEN responded to Kochin's question by observing that there
were in fact connections between money rates in New York and else-
where in the UnitedStates. However, these connectionswere apparently
quite different from those observed by Rich for Canada. For the first
decade ofthetwentiethcentury, ratesinSt. Louis andsimilarmidwestern
centers typically fluctuated one to one-and-a-half months in advance of
the New York rate. The explanation for these fluctuations is found in the
harvest cycle: Interest rates in the agricultural regions rose when the
demand for cash was stimulated by increasing economic activity during
theplantingseasonin thespring andthe harvestseasonin thefall. Higher
interest rates in the West attracted funds from the East, as southern and
western banks liquidated their correspondent balances in New York in
order to exploit the profit opportunities provided by interregional in-
terest arbitrage. Theoutflowoffunds from New Yorkthenraisedinterest
rates in the East. It does not appear likely the relationship between
interest-ratefluctuations in MontrealandinNewYorkobservedin Rich's
paperonCanadareflects the impactonlocal money-marketconditions of
the agricultural cycle, for that explanation would suggest that Canadian
rates should have led rather than lagged rates in New York. The lagging
behavior of Canadian rates may therefore reflect the imperfectly com-
petitive nature of the Canadian money market.
A number ofparticipants expressed reasons for skepticism concerning
use of the call-loan rate in Montreal. For example, LINDERT noted that583 Canada without a Central Bank, 1872-1913
the call rate was recorded as unchanging from October 1906 through
April 1908, a period that spanned the 1907 financial panic in the United
States. It is unlikely, therefore, that this series reflects the actual cost of
funds. MOGGRIDGE notedthatit madelittle differencewhich call-loan rate
was considered, because the Canadian banking system was much less
competitive than the U.S. system. Indeed, the Canadian system was
oligopolistic, and the few banks in existence coordinated their adminis-
tration of call-money rates.
RICH acknowledged that the Canadian call-loan rate was probably not
comparablewiththeNewYarkcall-loanratebecause Canadiancall loans
seldomwere called. Healso discussedtheproblemoftheconstancyofthe
rate. In the contemporary literature, there is considerable discussion of
price-fixing among oligopolistic banks, which may explain why the rate
sometimes failed to move with changing market conditions. However,
that literature fails to address the linkages between the U.S. and the
Canadian markets. Those links were close enough that such price-fixing
arrangements probably could not have survived for long.
Rich insisted that the Canadian call-loan ratelagged the business cycle
and the New York call-loan rate. He had considered the question of
whetherCanadawas notsimply a regionwithin aunified NorthAmerican
financial market comparable to various regions in the United States,
which is why he included the Boston call-loan rate. The Boston call-loan
rate fails to lag the business cycle in the mannerofthe Montreal call-loan
rate. However, rates on longer-term assets in Boston do begin to lag
interest rates in New York. Rich also had attempted to consider other
interest rates for Canada, but that had proven difficult because of data
limitations. His preliminary conclusions were that federal-, provincial-,
and municipal-government bond yields in Canada evince no cyclical
relationship to yields in the United States. Rich had also considered a
series for the average return on bank loans for one Canadian bank and
compared it to estimates of the return on U.S. bank loans for various
regions. All he could conclude was that the patternofyields is extremely
complex.PART
v. The Gold Standard
as a Stabilizer of
Commodity Prices